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Strong, Cheap, and Ready Access to Body-worn Camera Footage under New Jersey’s Open 
Public Records Act (OPRA) Will Promote Police Accountability and Transparency 
Nicholas Delaney* 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Consider the following hypothetical:  Officer Owen equipped with a body-worn camera 
(BWC) is in hot pursuit of Suspect Sam, allegedly eluding after attempting to steal an automobile.  
While fleeing, Sam loses control of his SUV and strikes a guardrail.  Three more officers arrive at 
the scene.  According to Owen, Sam peels out his tires and fills the road with smoke in an attempt 
to dislodge Sam’s vehicle from the guardrail.  Gaining a moment of traction, Sam’s vehicle lunges 
toward the nearby officers.  The four officers discharge thirteen rounds toward Sam.  Sam is black.1  
Suppose further that Owen’s department is under investigation for discriminatory use of force 
practices and that Owen ran up to Sam after the shooting and recorded graphic details of Sam’s 
last words.2  Should the public have full access to the footage?  Should the government be able to 
withhold the footage while it conducts an investigation?  Should the suspect’s family have a say?   
This Comment argues New Jersey courts should interpret the state’s Open Public Records 
Act (OPRA)3 as generally granting the public access to BWC footage, such that the requestor 
should rarely need to prove her interest in disclosure outweighs the government’s interest in 
confidentiality.   
In the wake of fatal police shootings and nationwide race polemics, law enforcement 
agencies across the nation have deployed BWCs to promote police accountability and 
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1 Except for the events being captured by a dashcam not a BWC, these facts track those in North Jersey Media Group, 
Inc. v. Township of Lyndhurst, 163 A.3d 887, 892 (N.J. 2017). 
2 These facts now diverge from North Jersey Media Group. 




transparency.4  New Jersey is no exception to the trend; the state’s executive branch has invested 
millions into BWC equipment for its law enforcement officers.5  According to statewide policies 
issued by the Attorney General, law enforcement agencies favor increased use of BWC to promote 
accountability in police departments, to foster the public’s confidence in police departments, and 
to make communities safer.6  Both research and common sense dictate, however, that these policy 
goals will be achieved only if the public can access the footage.7  Yet, the public’s right to access 
BWC footage in New Jersey remains terra incognita:  neither the judiciary nor the legislature has 
provided guidance in this nascent field of government recordkeeping.   
In New Jersey, the public may demand access to public records under OPRA or the 
common law.8  Under OPRA, the requestor has a right to access public records, without stating 
her reasons; OPRA rights can be overcome only where the government makes a clear showing that 
an enumerated exception to the statute applies.9  The government has seven business days to 
respond to an OPRA request.10  The requestor may enforce the statute with fee-shifting 
                                                 
 
4 Karson Kampfe, Police-worn Body Cameras: Balancing Privacy and Accountability Through State and Police 
Department Action, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1153, 1153 (2015); Brian Liebman, The Watchman Blinded: Does the North 
Carolina Public Records Law Frustrate the Purposes of Police Body Cameras?, 94 N.C. L. REV. 344, 344 (2015); 
David K. Bakardjiev, Officer Body-Worn Cameras—Capturing Objective Evidence with Quality Technology and 
Focused Polies, 56 JURIMETRICS J. 79, 79 (2015). 
5 See Samantha Marcus, Body Cams Coming to a Cop Near You As N.J. Pledges Millions to Equip Officers, NJ.COM 
(July 28, 2015), http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/07/body_cams_coming_to_a_cop_near_you_as_nj_ 
pledges_millions_to_equip_officers.html. 
6 John J. Hoffman, Attorney General Law Enforcement Directive No. 2015-1 (2015), 
http://nj.gov/oag/newsreleases15/AG-Directive_Body-Cams.pdf [hereinafter Directive]. 
7 Steve Zansberg, As Body-Worn Cameras Proliferate, States’ Access Restrictions Defeat Their Purpose, 32 COMM. 
LAW., 12, 14 (2016) (“[T]he cause of improving accountability, transparency and public trust is undercut when footage 
is not released . . . . ”). 
8 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-8 (providing that OPRA does not limit the common law right of access to a government 
record); see Gilleran v. Bloomfield, 149 A.3d 800 (N.J. 2016).  
9 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-1; N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Twp. Of Lyndhurst, 163 A.3d 887, 895 (N.J. 2017) 
(citation omitted).  




provisions11 and statutory penalties up to $5,000 per violation.12  New Jersey also recognizes a 
limited common law right to access public records.13  The common law requestor must state her 
reasons for seeking records and must always demonstrate that her interests in disclosure outweigh 
the government’s interest in confidentiality.14  The requestor may not demand fees or compel 
disclosure through summary procedures.15 
Although New Jersey courts have not yet examined any OPRA or common law requests 
for BWC footage, the judiciary has heard requests for dashcam and surveillance footage.16  Based 
on this precedent, the Supreme Court of New Jersey (SCONJ) appears poised to grant the public 
limited access to BWC footage under the common law, but disinclined to hold that OPRA 
guarantees a right to such footage.17  
SCONJ should not adopt the common law approach.  Routinely subjecting requests to 
common law analysis—even if legally defensible—will frustrate the accountability and 
transparency goals of the BWC program.18  In contrast to OPRA, common law requests move 
slowly,19 lack uniformity,20 and fail to reach documents in which the government’s interest in 
                                                 
 
11 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-6. 
12 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-11. 
13 See, e.g., Loigman v. Kimmelman, 505 A.2d 958 (N.J. 1986). 
14 See, e.g., Paff v. Ocean Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 141 A.3d 300 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016), cert. granted, 157 
A.3d 831 (N.J. 2016). 
15 Compare Loigman v. Kimmelman, 505 A.2d 958 (N.J. 1986), with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-6. 
16 Gilleran v. Bloomfield, 149 A.3d 800, 803 (N.J. 2016); N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Twp. of Lyndhurst, 163 
A.3d 887 (N.J. 2017); Paff v. Ocean Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 141 A.3d 300 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016), cert. 
granted, 157 A.3d 831 (N.J. 2016). 
17 See infra Parts IV and V.  
18 Implementing a Body-Worn Camera Program: Recommendations and Lessons Learned, POLICE EXECUTIVE RES. 
F., 64 (2014) (“Agencies should always communicate their public disclosure policies to the public.”). 
19 Compare N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Twp. of Lyndhurst, 163 A.3d 887 (N.J. 2017) (granting common law 
access to dashcam footage two years after filing a complaint in the superior court), with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-
5(i) (requiring government respond to records requests with seven days), and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-6 (providing 
that an OPRA “proceeding shall proceed in a summary or expedited manner.”). 
20 Shuttleworth v. City of Camden, 610 A.2d 903, 908 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (finding records requests 
languish in courts without OPRA’s procedural guarantees, and disposition of requests is not uniform when 




confidentiality outweighs the requestor’s interest in disclosure.21  Common law requests also 
regularly pitch the judiciary against the political branches, implicating separation of powers 
questions.22  In order to effectuate the policy goals of BWC programs, the public must have 
OPRA’s presumption of access, fee-shifting provisions, and summary procedures.  The common 
law, which requires the requestor prove a stronger interest in disclosure than in governmental 
confidentialities,23 places the burden on the requestor.  Such a burden is antithetical to 
transparency:  the government’s doors are always shut, unless courts permit the citizen to push 
in.24  Common law requestors must wait months, if not years, for requests to be decided and must 
bear all costs and fees of the suit.25  The limited and delayed access afforded by the common law 
will contribute to the perception that agencies purposely withhold footage to bury misconduct and 
frustrate meritorious lawsuits against officers.26  Only statutory rights granting access to BWC 
footage can effectuate the policy goals of the BWC program.27  
In the BWC hypothetical above, the public is likely to assume the government has 
something to hide if the police attempt to withhold the footage recorded by Owen’s BWC.28  If the 
                                                 
 
21 Loigman v. Kimmelman, 505 A.2d 958 (N.J. 1986). 
22 Id. at 967. 
23 Id. at 961. 
24 New Jersey citizens have had a statutory right to access public records since 1963.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-1 et 
seq., L. 1963 (repealed 2002).  Turning the clock back to an age before statutory access—barring the door to citizens 
seeking BWC and other police footage—might evoke comparisons to Kafka’s parable “Before the Law” wherein the 
old man seeking to peek into “the law” is kept outside by several gatekeepers so long, the information seeker dies 
before the door.  Frank Kafka, Before the Law, in FRANZ KAFKA: THE COMPLETE STORIES AND PARABLES 3-4 (New 
York: Quality Paperback Book Club ed., 1971) (Willa & Edwin Muir trans.). 
25 Shuttleworth v. City of Camden, 610 A.2d 903, 908 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (finding records requests 
languish in courts without OPRA’s procedural guarantees and disposition of requests is not uniform when dependent 
upon access to competent (costly) counsel to plead requests well in court). 
26 N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Twp. Of Lyndhurst, 163 A.3d 887, 907 (2017).  
27 See Toby McIntosh and Lauren Harper, Backlash Develops over Body Cam Footage, FREEDOM INFO. (Feb. 26, 
2015), http://www.freedominfo.org/2015/02/backlash-develops-over-release-of-body-cam-footage (noting that “[i]f 
the footage isn’t available, ‘body cam’ supporters say, the promise of having silent watchdogs over police-citizen 
interactions will go unfulfilled”).  




camera manages to record the salient events, the footage will either show Sam lunged his SUV 
toward officers or that Sam gave the officers no reason to fear for their safety.29  Policy would best 
be served by OPRA’s right to access records swiftly which shifts fees onto agencies resistant to 
transparency.30  
The judiciary may be inclined to balance the competing interests in disclosure and 
nondisclosure of BWC footage under the common law as a means of addressing the thorny 
problems inhering in such footage.31  SCONJ may prefer to grant common law access in BWC 
cases even more so than in other cases requesting dashcam footage of other police recordings 
because—unlike dashcams fixed to police vehicles on public roadways or surveillance videos 
affixed to public buildings—BWCs can record up-close images and high-quality audio within 
realms traditionally deemed private,32 thus meriting special consideration.  BWC cameras can 
capture an overwhelming amount and variety of images—which can implicate serious privacy 
concerns33 and jeopardize the safety of informants, witnesses, and victims.34  Rather than 
circumventing OPRA’s mandates and shunting requests for BWC footage to the common law, 
courts should earnestly engage in an OPRA analysis.  OPRA permits courts to weigh privacy 
                                                 
 
29 Cf. id. at 909. 
30 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-6 (2002). 
31 Cf. Gilleran v. Bloomfield, 149 A.3d 800, 803 (N.J. 2016) (declaring the court’s preference for common law 
balancing in right of access to government surveillance footage). 
32 Directive, supra note 6, 3-4. 
33 Marc Jonathan Blitz, Police Body-Worn Cameras: Evidentiary Benefits and Privacy Threats, 2015 WAKE FOREST 
J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 18–19 (“[M]ost state open records laws were written before the use of body-worn 
cameras and may not take into account the privacy issues presented by their use.”) (citing THE CONSTITUTION 
PROJECT, THE USE OF BODY-WORK CAMERAS BY LAW ENFORCEMENT 5 (2015), https://constitutionproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/TCP-The-Use-of-Police-Body-Worn-Cameras.pdf (suggesting citizens should have to 
consent to dissemination of video)). 
34 See, e.g., Directive, supra note 6, 4; Gilleran v. Bloomfield, 149 A.3d 800, 802 (N.J. 2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 




concerns35 and governmental needs for confidentiality to secure safety36; the common law is not 
the only means available to the courts to balance public and private interests.37 
Part II of this Comment notes policy goals promoted by BWCs nationwide and in the State 
of New Jersey.  Part III summarizes access to government records under OPRA and New Jersey’s 
common law.  Part IV examines New Jersey precedent addressing the right to access dashcam and 
surveillance footage.  Part V argues the courts should find that OPRA provides a statutory right to 
access BWC footage and criticizes precedent that broadly construes OPRA exemptions to deny 
requests for government surveillance and dashcam footage.  Part V also explains OPRA’s privacy 
protections.  Part VI concludes. 
II. Policies Generally Animating the Use of BWCs Nationwide and in New Jersey 
 
Numerous policy goals underpin the use of BWCs throughout the United States.  Chief among 
these are government transparency and accountability, demanded in the wake of police shootings 
of African Americans including Michael Brown in Ferguson, Mississippi.38  BWCs are also 
associated with a civilizing effect; the cameras arguably promote a concept of self-awareness, 
thought to civilize police officers and citizens alike.39  BWCs create reviewable records useful in 
investigating allegations of police misconduct, ranging from unconstitutional searches to excessive 
force.40  Thus where footage captures misconduct or its absence, the inculpatory or exculpatory 
                                                 
 
35 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-1 (“[A] public agency has a responsibility and an obligation to safeguard from 
public access a citizen’s personal information with which it has been entrusted when disclosure thereof would violate 
the citizen’s reasonable expectation of privacy.”). 
36 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-1.1 (“[E]mergency or security information or procedures for any buildings or facility 
which, if disclosed, would jeopardize security of the building or facility or persons therein; security measures and 
surveillance techniques which, if disclosed, would create a risk to the safety of persons, property, electronic data or 
software.”). 
37 Serrano v. South Brunswick Twp., 817 A.2d 1004, 1014–15 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003); see also infra Part 
VI. 
38 Kampfe, supra note 4, at 1153; Liebman, supra note 4, at 344; Bakardjiev, supra note 4, at 79. 
39 Kampfe, supra note 4, at 1161. 




footage obviates the need for prolonged investigations and enables police departments to act 
swiftly.41  BWCs are associated with a decrease in complaints against officers for misconduct, 
attributable to the deterrence of filing false complaints, the civilizing effect, or both.42   Although 
not strictly objective, BWCs preserve footage from the officer’s perspective which contextualizes 
any recordings made by the public—an important consideration in the age of ubiquitous smart 
phone cameras.43  Footage of appropriate and inappropriate conduct may be used for training 
purposes and performance evaluations.44  BWCs generate powerful evidence which prosecutors 
can use to secure guilty pleas and convictions, thereby promoting judicial efficiency.45  BWCs 
empower prosecutors to press cases with BWC evidence, even absent a complainant in matters 
such as domestic violence where a victim refuses to testify.46  Lastly, BWCs can provide for 
“democratic accountability” even where judicial accountability fails:  even though footage of the 
chokehold that killed Eric Garner grounded no conviction, the footage led to public 
condemnation.47 
The goals of the BWC program in New Jersey track the majority of the goals throughout 
the nation.48  The Attorney General Directive No. 2015-1 (Directive) sent to law enforcement 
                                                 
 
41 Josh Divine et al., Police Body Cam Footage: Just Another Public Record, THE MEDIA FREEDOM & INFORMATION 
ACCESS CLINIC, 7 (2015). 
42 Kampfe, supra note 4, at 1165. 
43 Id. 1167. 
44 Camden Cty. Police Depart., Special Order No. 2016-014, Body Worn Camera Program, § II, B(6)–(9) May 20, 
2016, https://www.rcfp.org/bodycam_policies/NJ/Camden_BWC_Policy.pdf. 
45 Bakardjiev, supra note 4, at 81. 
46 See Email from Jessica Miles, Assoc. Clinical Prof. of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law, to author (Nov. 
4, 2017, 9:10 EST) (on file with author) (regarding New Jersey’s “no drop” persecution policy); see generally Sandra 
Tibbettes Murphy, Police Body Cameras and Sexual Assault Investigations: Considerations and Unanswered 
Questions, Battered Women’s Justice Project (n.d.), http://www.bwjp.org/assets/documents/pdfs/police-body-cams-
in-domestic-and-sexual-assault-inve.pdf. 
47 Id. 
48 The Directive does not reference “no drop” prosecution of domestic violence cases, or use of footage for police 
training and performance reviews. Directive, supra note 6.  The omission to training and evaluation makes it less 
likely police departments may withhold footage pursuant to a common law exception for “self-critical” training and 




officers in 2016 explains the State’s reasons for using BWCs and sets minimum statewide 
standards for BWC use:  “It is decidedly in the public interest to establish foundational statewide 
standards with respect to certain critical policy issues, such as how an agency explains its BWC 
policy to the general public . . . .”49  The Directive enumerates several discrete goals: (1) to promote 
police accountability and transparency; (2) to establish compliance with the Fourth Amendment, 
Miranda,50 and other legal requirements; (3) to curb false accusations of police misconduct; (4) to 
promote a civilizing effect on officers and civilians who are aware of the activated BWC; (5) to 
create objective records to supplemental and corroborate written reports useful in the prosecution 
of crimes; and (6) to limit discretion of individual officers in the field, thereby prohibiting racially-
influenced activation/de-activation of BWCs and the impression that officers film events only for 
self-serving purposes.51  An agency deploying BWCs must publish a statement on its website.52  
“The web posting shall include a picture showing what the device looks like, and how it is to be 
worn by uniformed officers or plainclothes detectives so that citizens will be able to determine 
whether an officer is equipped with the device.”53  The Directive stops short of declaring a 
disclosure policy for the footage and simply states footage may be available to the public pursuant 
to OPRA and the common law.54    
III: Public Access to Government Records Under OPRA and the Common Law 
                                                 
 
footage may be exempted as part of an officer’s personnel file pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-10 (2002).  See 
Liebman, supra note 4, at 353, n.63 (noting police chiefs in North Carolina argued BWC footage should be exempt 
as personnel records under the state public disclosure laws). 
49  Directive, supra note 6. 
50 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
51 Id. at 2, 7.  The Directive also declares goals in tension with these policies, such as minimizing privacy intrusions 
and eschewing the chilling effect on cooperation with police.  Directive, supra note 6, 1; see infra Part V-C. 
52 Id. at 7. 
53 Id. 




An individual seeking access to public records initiates her request by sending a written 
request to the relevant government agency in charge of maintaining the government record.55  The 
requestor may seek access under OPRA, under state common law, or under both.56   
A. The Public’s Right to Access Under OPRA 
 
New Jersey has long appreciated “that openness [in government] reduces public 
corruption.”57  The legislature has declared that, “secrecy in public affairs undermines the faith of 
the public in government and the public’s effectiveness in fulfilling its role in a democratic 
society.”58  In 1963, the legislature enacted OPRA’s predecessor, known as the Right to Know 
Law (RTKL).59  From 1963 to 2002, RTKL guaranteed the public access to records which were 
“required by law to be made.”60  Contemporaneous courts touted RTKL as a high water mark in 
the State’s “long and proud tradition[] of . . . hostility to secrecy in government.”61  But RTKL 
actually excluded heaps of government records, and granted access only to records “required by 
law to be made”—a term of art which grew increasingly crabbed over the course of statute’s 
                                                 
 
55 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-5 (2002) (providing that a requestor may also inspect records during regular business 
hours). 
56 Cf. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-1. 
57 Cf. Tarus v. Borough of Pine Hill, 916 A.2d 1036, 1043 (N.J. 2007) (“[O]ur civic forefathers have long recognized 
that spores of corruption cannot survive the light of public scrutiny.”) (citing Polillo v. Deane, 379 A.2d 211 (N.J. 
1977) (quoting Woodrow Wilson’s observation that “[C]orruption thrives in secret places, and avoids public places.”) 
(citation omitted); Earl Warren, Governmental Secrecy: Corruption’s Ally, 60 A.B.A.J. 550, 552 (1974) (“It would be 
difficult to name a more efficient ally of corruption than secrecy.”).  
58 OPRA, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-7 (2006). 
59 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-1 et seq. (1963) (repealed 2002).  
60 N.J. STAT. ANN. §. 47:1A-2 (1963). 
61 Educ. Law Ctr. v. N.J. Dep’t of Educ., 966 A.2d 1054 (2009) (citing N.J. Newspapers v. Passaic Cty. Bd. Of Chosen 
Freeholders, 601 A.2d 693 (1992)).  See also S. Jersey Pub v. N.J. Expressway Auth., 591 A.2d 92, 928 (N.J. 1991) 
(quoting James Madison’s letter to W.T. Barry, Aug. 4, 1822, in 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (G. Hunt ed. 
1910)) (“A popular Government without popular information, or the means to acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce 
of a Tragedy; or perhaps both.  Knowledge will forever govern ignorance.  And a people who mean to be their own 




lifespan.62  As RTKL’s scope narrowed, requestors relied increasingly on their common law right 
of access, requiring courts to engage in common law analysis.63  
In 2002, the legislature repealed RTKL and enacted OPRA in order to expand the public’s 
statutory rights to public records in 2002.64  OPRA vests the public with a presumption of access 
to government records65 and mandates that “government records . . . be readily accessible for 
[public] inspection, copying, or examination.”66  “Government records” means “any paper, written 
or printed book, document, drawing, map, plan, photograph, microfilm, data processed or image 
processed document, information stored or maintained electronically or by sound-recording or in 
a similar device . . . .”67  OPRA’s broader definition of government records guarantees greater 
access to government records and therefore “maximize[s] public knowledge about public affairs,” 
“ensure[s] an informed citizenry,” “minimize[s] the evils inherent in a secluded process,”68 and 
“promote[s] good government.”69  With “broad public access to information about how state and 
local governments operate, citizens and the media can play a watchful role in curbing wasteful 
government spending and guarding against corruption and misconduct.”70  In grander terms: 
OPRA is founded on the premise that society as a whole suffers far more if 
governmental bodies are permitted to operate in secrecy.  As Justice William O. 
Douglas has said: “The generation that made the nation thought secrecy in 
government one of the instruments of Old World tyranny and committed itself to 
                                                 
 
62 N. Jersey Media Grp, Inc. v. Twp. of Lyndhurst, 116 A.3d 570, 584 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015). 
63 See, e.g., Loigman v. Kimmelman, 505 A.2d 958, 967 (N.J. 1986); Nero v. Hyland, 386 A.2d 846, 852 (N.J. 1978); 
see infra Part III-B. 
64 N.J. STAT. ANN. 47:1A-1 to -13; Gilleran v. Bloomfield, 149 A.3d 800, 815, n.6 (N.J. 2016) (Rabner, C.J., 
dissenting). 
65 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-1. 
66 Id.   
67 Id. § 47:1A-1.1 (emphasis added). 
68 Educ. Law Ctr. v. N.J. Dep’t of Educ., 966 A.2d 1054 (N.J. 2009) (citing Mason v. City of Hoboken, 951 A.2d 1017 
(N.J. 2008) (internal quotations omitted)).  
69 N. Jersey Media Grp, Inc. v. Bergen Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 146 A.3d 656, 664 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016)  




the principle that a democracy cannot function unless the people are permitted to 
know what their government is up to.”71    
 
Unlike its predecessor, OPRA guarantees citizens access to “all government records . . . unless 
exempt” under one of the twenty-one enumerated carve-outs within the statute or within other 
statutes, regulations, and executive orders.72  OPRA often grants a broader access to government 
records than the common law.73  The Act does not require the requestor to state reasons for seeking 
the records74 and compels agencies to respond to requests within seven days.75  If denied, a 
requestor may sue the opaque agency.76  Exemptions to the statute are construed in favor of public 
access.77  The agency denying access bears the burden of clearly showing an exemption applies.78  
If a court orders records released after an improper denial, the requestor is entitled to counsel 
fees.79  Litigation frequently arises where agencies deny access to records pursuant to an 
exemption.80 
i. Statutory Exceptions to OPRA—Criminal Investigations, Ongoing 
Investigations, and Security Exceptions 
 
                                                 
 
71 Asbury Park Press v. Ocean Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 864 A.2d 446, 488 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2004) (citing EPA v. 
Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 105 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting omitted). 
72 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-1.1. (carving out additional exemptions for state statutes, executive orders, rules of court, 
administrative rules, federal law, federal regulations, and federal orders); see also N.J.S.A. 47:1A-9 and N. Jersey 
Media Grp, Inc. v. Bergen Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 146 A.3d 656, 667 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016) (recognizing 
administrative regulations as further carve outs); N.J.S.A. 47:1A-12 (providing that SCONJ may adopt court rules to 
effectuate the purposes of this act); OPRA further recognizes privileges and grants of confidentiality carved out in 
judicial case law before 2002, which do not, of course, address the use of BWCs. N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1. BWC literature 
suggests officers only began being equipped with BWCs in the United States around 2009.  Kampfe, supra note 4, 
1153.  
73 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-1.1. 
74 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-5. 
75 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-5(i). 
76 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-6 (permitting the requestor to bring the issue before the Government Records Council).  
The Council may provide informal mediation, undertake investigations, and impose penalties against government 
agencies for wrongful nondisclosure.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-6. 
77 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-1. 
78 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-6. 
79 Id. 
80 See, e.g., N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Twp. of Lyndhurst, 163 A.3d 887 (N.J. 2017); Gilleran v. Bloomfield, 149 




OPRA exempts records pertaining to criminal investigations, ongoing investigations, and 
government security. 
Criminal investigatory records are as those which: (1) are “not required by law to be made”; 
and (2) “pertain[] to any criminal investigation or related civil enforcement proceeding.”81  Both 
factors must be met, and the government must make a “clear showing” that the OPRA exemption 
applies.82   
OPRA also exempts records related to an ongoing investigation.83  To qualify for the 
exemption the government must show: (1) the records clearly “pertain to an investigation in 
progress by any public agency”; (2) disclosure will be inimical to the public interest; and (3) the 
records were not “open for public inspection, examination, or copying before the investigation 
commenced.”84  The public interest exception is met where it appears, “the information requested 
. . . will jeopardize the safety of any person or jeopardize any investigation in progress or may be 
otherwise inappropriate to release.”85 
OPRA exempts records related to security of public buildings and police surveillance.86  
OPRA provides that “emergency or security information or procedures for any buildings or facility 
which, if disclosed, would jeopardize security of the building or facility or persons therein.”87  
OPRA further exempts disclosure of “security measures and surveillance techniques which, if 
disclosed, would create a risk to the safety of persons, property, electronic data or software.”88   
                                                 
 
81 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-1.1. 
82 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-6; see also N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Twp. of Lyndhurst, 163 A.3d 887 (N.J. 2017) (7-
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83 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-3(a), (b). 
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ii. Executive Exceptions to OPRA—Attorney General’s Directive No. 2015-1 and 
Governor Whitman’s Executive Order No. 69 
 
SCONJ has not ruled whether BWC footage is a government record and whether BWC 
footage is required to be recorded by law under OPRA.  As an initial matter, SCONJ held that 
dashcam footage was a public record under OPRA in North Jersey Media Group v. Township of 
Lyndhurst (“NJMG”).89  It seems the court will duly deem BWC footage a public record under 
OPRA.  As a second matter, the Attorney General’s Directive No. 2015-1 may require as a matter 
of law that some BWC footage be recorded in certain circumstances, which would preclude the 
government from exempting BWC under the criminal investigation exception.  It is also possible, 
however, Governor Whitman’s Executive Order No. 69 simplifies the criminal investigation 
exception inquiry and would permit the government to exclude BWC footage upon a simple 
showing that the video pertains to a criminal investigation. 
 OPRA recognizes the executive’s power to create exemptions not otherwise enumerated 
within the Act.90  For instance, courts have repeatedly recognized that the standing order of a local 
police chief carries the force of law.91  In Paff v. Ocean County Prosecutor’s Office, the Appellate 
Division found that a local police chief’s standing order required the creation and maintenance of 
dashcam footage by law in certain circumstances.92  As the standing order had the force of law, 
the records custodian could not exclude dashcam footage under OPRA’s criminal investigation 
exception.93  After all, the exception excludes only records “not required by law to be made.”94  
                                                 
 
89 N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Twp. of Lyndhurst, 163 A.3d 887 (N.J. 2017) (7-0 decision). 
90 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-9. 
91 Paff v. Ocean Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 141 A.3d 300 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016), cert. granted, 157 A.3d 831 
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831 (N.J. 2016). 
93 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-6. 




As a local police chief in Paff had the power to require dashcam footage be recorded by law, the 
Attorney General should have, a fortiori, the authority to require records such as BWC footage be 
made.95  Indeed, as “the State’s chief law enforcement officer,” the Attorney General “has the 
authority to adopt guidelines, directives, and policies that bind police departments throughout the 
State.”96  
The Attorney General’s Directive No. 2015-1, discussed in Part II above, directs law 
enforcement officers when to activate and deactivate BWCs.97  The Attorney General claims to 
derive his authority to issue the Directive from Title 52, Section 17B-98 of New Jersey Statutes 
Annotated, a provision authorizing him to ensure uniform and efficient enforcement of criminal 
laws.98  Title 52, Section 17B-112(c) of New Jersey Statutes Annotated further orders enforcement 
officers to cooperate and aid the Attorney General.99  The Directive authorizes county prosecutors 
to ensure compliance and prevent violations of the Directive’s mandates.100  This all suggests the 
Directive carries the force of law.  More than a mere generic set of rules about record retention, 
the Directive is a “clear, pointed statement of policy from the chief law enforcement officer to all 
officers” which requires BWC footage be recorded by law under numerous circumstances.101   
The Directive may therefore make the footage “required by law.”  Should SCONJ 
determine that the Directive carries the force of law, the Directive is likely to remove much BWC 
                                                 
 
95 A singular Appellate Division decision has ruled the Directive does “not constitute an administrative rule” under 
the state’s Administrative Procedure Act.  State Troopers Fraternal Ass’n of N.J. v. State, No. A-5239-14T3, 2016 
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footage from OPRA’s criminal investigation exemption, which excludes only records “not 
required by law to be made.”102   
This said, Governor Whitman’s Executive Order No. 69 adds a significant wrinkle to this 
prediction.  It is well settled that an executive order, as much as any directive, can create an 
exemption under OPRA.103  Executive Order No. 69 exempts “fingerprint cards, plates and 
photographs and similar criminal investigation records that are required to be made, maintained 
or kept by any State or local governmental agency.”104  This language tracks Executive Order No. 
9, issued by Governor Hughes on September 30, 1963, and Executive Order No. 123, issued by 
Governor Kean on November 12, 1985.105  In interpreting the clause “similar criminal 
investigation records,” one Law Division court relied on eiusdem generis—the cannon of 
construction assuming the scrivener intended to list items of the same kinds, class or nature—
holding that “similar criminal investigation records” did not apply to “incident reports and 
statements of witnesses prepared by police officers which bear no similarity to fingerprint cards, 
plates or photographs.”106  Following this rationale, similar criminal investigation records may 
very well include dashcam, surveillance, and BWC footage, which are arguably similar to 
photographs.  On procedural grounds, courts have twice declined to rule whether Executive Order 
No. 69 is still in effect and whether it renders the first prong of the OPRA’s criminal investigation 
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exemption nugatory,107 such that any records pertaining to a criminal investigation would be 
exempt whether “required by law” or not.108   
To summarize, whether BWC footage can be excluded under OPRA depends on whether 
Governor Whitman’s Executive Order No. 69 applies to BWC footage and whether the Order is 
still in effect.  If both questions are answered affirmatively, BWC footage pertaining to a criminal 
investigation will be exempt from disclosure under OPRA.  If a court answers no to either question, 
footage pertaining to a criminal investigation will be excluded only as part of a criminal 
investigation where another law requires the footage be made.  
B. The Public’s Right to Access Under State Common Law 
 Even where an exception precludes the public from gaining access to public records under 
OPRA, New Jersey citizens may still demand access to public records under the state’s common 
law—a right traceable to at least 1879.109  Ordinarily, to avail herself of this right, the requestor 
need only show that she is a citizen or taxpayer of New Jersey and that she is seeking the records 
in good faith.110  A newspaper’s interest in “keep[ing] a watchful eye on the workings of public 
agencies” is sufficient to accord standing.111  Yet, the government can frustrate the ordinary 
                                                 
 
107 Paff v. Ocean Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 141 A.3d 300 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016), cert. granted, 157 A.3d 
831 (N.J. 2016).  It is no surprise that courts latch on to procedural grounds to avoid deciding which political branch 
or department should control the release of such footage.  Justice O’Hern wisely called on the legislature to craft a 
comprehensive access of information law to avoid such problems.  Loigman, 505 A.2d 958, 958. 
108 It may be argued the governor could not have intended to include BWC in 1997 as a “similar” record because the 
technology did not exist.  After all, researchers have generally traced the use of BWC in the United States only as far 
back as 2010 in Oakland, California.  Kampfe, supra note 4, at 1156, n.13 (tracing one of the earliest 
implementations of BCWs in the world to the United Kingdom around 2007).  This argument is generally 
unavailing.  Cf. Tarus v. Borough of Pine Hill, 916 A.2d 1036, 1043–44 (N.J. 2007) (noting the court’s willingness 
to evolve and adapt as technology advances).  The governor may have expressly opened the list to similar records to 
include new technology. 
109 In re. Ferry v. Williams, 41 N.J.L. 332 (1879). 
110 Good faith means some purpose other than harassment, disparagement, or intimidation.  Cf. Loigman v. 
Kimmelman, 505 A.2d 958, 962 (N.J. 1986). 




situation by asserting the record is confidential.112  The courts must then weigh the requestor’s 
interest in disclosure against the government’s interest in the maintaining confidentiality (the 
“Loigman test”).113  Courts apply a sliding scale.114  Where there is a slight or non-existent 
governmental need in confidentiality, citizenship status will ordinarily warrant disclosure.115  As 
the government’s need for confidentiality increases, something more than mere taxpayer or 
citizenship status coupled with good faith is required to demand production.116  The requestor must 
clearly show an advancement of a “wholesome” public interest or legitimate private interest to 
warrant disclosure.117  In weighing competing interests, the court may consider: (1) the extent to 
which disclosure will chill cooperation with the government; (2) the effect disclosure may have on 
persons who gave the government information, e.g., whether disclosure was conditioned on 
anonymity; (3) whether findings of public misconduct have been insufficiently corrected; and (4) 
whether disciplinary or investigatory proceedings that diminish the citizen’s need for the records 
have taken place.118 
Ultimately, the common law approach has several drawbacks: it moves slowly, lacks 
uniformity, and the Loigman test limits its reach.  Common law requests are slower because 
litigation can languish, and the common law does not permit the requestor to move summarily.119  
Disposition of common law requests lack uniformity because access to competent counsel shapes 
the ultimate outcome120 and because the Loigman test requires a fact-intensive inquiry calling for 
                                                 
 
112 Loigman, 505 A.2d at 962. 
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law access to dashcam footage two years after filing complaint in Superior Court). 




detailed testimony as to the parties’ competing interests and perhaps even in camera review of the 
requested records.121   
As citizens may request access to any record prepared by a State agency regardless of 
statutory exceptions, it is sometimes argued the common law grants a broader right to records than 
OPRA122; in the main, this view can be debunked.  First, judges have created numerous common 
law exceptions to the right of access under the common.123  In fact, the legislature codified these 
judicial exceptions into OPRA.124  Accordingly, the holes in OPRA closely track the holes in the 
common law.125  Further, the Loigman test will weed out numerous requests which would prevail 
under OPRA, and only citizens and taxpayers can make applications. 
What’s more, requests for access under the common law force the judiciary to intrude into 
activities of the executive and legislative branches.126  Whereas courts decide OPRA requests in 
accordance with the laws promulgated by the legislature and the exceptions carved out by the 
executive, the judiciary pulls from its inherent powers to enforce common law requests.  In 1986, 
the unanimous Loigman court recognized that the very common law balancing test it was fleshing 
in Loigman out flew in the teeth of separation of powers127:  
“[W]e are in the position of having to resolve a dispute between a citizen and 
another branch of government.  Rather than involving courts in balancing the 
                                                 
 
121 Loigman, 505 A.2d at 966. 
122 Loigman, 505 A.2d at 961; see also Educ. Law Ct. v. N.J. Dep’t of Educ., 966 A.2d 1054, 1071 (N.J. 2009). 
123 Loigman, 505 A.2d at 966. 
124 See e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-1. 
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127 For some of the delicate issues the court has been called to resolve, see Nero v. Hyland, 386 A.2d 846, 853 (N.J. 
1978) (recognizing the governor’s qualified constitutionally-based privilege of confidentiality based in the separation 
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2005) (remanding to determine whether politician’s notes were deliberative); Educ. Law Ctr. v. N.J. Dept. of Educ., 
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interests involved, the better policy may be that of comprehensive freedom-of-
information acts that give citizens an unqualified right of access to public records, 
subject to defined exemptions, without a showing of need.”128   
 
With this, Justice O’Hern challenged the wisdom of the very test the court’s opinion refined in 
Loigman.  OPRA is arguably the legislature’s comprehensive, if somewhat untimely response to 
O’Hern’s exhortation to reform RTKL.  Lamentably, recent SCONJ decisions appear unperturbed 
by O’Hern’s warning that a comprehensive act is preferable to the Loigman test.   
IV: New Jersey Surveillance and Dashcam Precedent 
 
Although New Jersey’s judiciary has yet not examined any requests for BWC footage, 
courts have addressed demands for dashcam and surveillance footage.  Part III-A examines SCONJ 
opinions.  Part III-B examines opinions of the state’s intermediate court.  
A. SCONJ Denies Access to Security and Dashcam Footage under OPRA  
 
 In Gilleran v. Bloomfield129 and NJMG,130 SCONJ limited public access to police footage 
by construing OPRA exemptions broadly. 
Over dissent, the Gilleran court generally exempted government security footage from 
OPRA requests where such footage tended to show the limitations of the surveillance system.131  
The majority denied a private citizen’s OPRA request for the “wholesale release” of fourteen hours 
of footage recorded by a stationary security camera concealed by smoked glass, attached to a 
second-story pole, and directed at the rear area of the town hall adjacent to the city’s police 
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130 N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Twp. of Lyndhurst, 163 A.3d 887 (N.J. 2017) (7-0 decision). 




station.132  Since disclosure could reveal the camera’s geographic scope and recording times,133 
the majority found the government’s denial of the citizen’s OPRA request justified under the Act’s 
security exceptions: “[1] emergency or security information or procedures for any buildings or 
facility which, if disclosed, would jeopardize security of the building or facility or persons therein; 
[2] security measures and surveillance techniques which, if disclosed, would create a risk to the 
safety of persons, property, electronic data or software.”134   
The majority relied on the certification from the township clerk—though neither the clerk 
nor anyone else had reviewed the entire footage—that release of the footage “could” jeopardize 
the safety of those potentially surveilled in the footage.135  SCONJ held the township need only 
show release of such footage “can lead to the undermining of the legislative public-interest policy 
embedded in the security exclusion.”136  After noting that “[c]urrent events since the new 
millennium [create] difficulties of maintaining daily security,”137  SCONJ called for a “sensible 
application” in construing OPRA’s security exceptions.138  The court found OPRA did not intend 
to create a right of access to footage from a single camera or “a combination of cameras” from 
police stations, court houses, correctional institutions, and the like that might permit a person to 
“dismantle the protection” provided by such systems.139  The court concluded public requests for 
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133 Id. at 802.  Although the Township had not yet reviewed the entire video, the government also argued the video 
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surveillance footage “protecting public facilities are better analyzed under common law . . . where 
the asserted need for access can be weighed against the needs of governmental confidentiality.”140  
 The Chief Justice, authoring the dissent, criticized the majority’s “sensible approach” as a 
derogation from OPRA’s mandate to construe exceptions to the Act in favor of the public’s right 
of access.141  The majority liberally construed the “would” in OPRA’s security exceptions, 
permitting the government to simply assert that safety “could” be jeopardized—this without 
anyone ever having reviewed the footage.142   Although the majority’s construction of the security 
exemptions “may be a sensible approach as a matter of policy,”143 wrote the Chief Justice, “OPRA 
does not say that all security footage is categorically exempt from public disclosure.”144  The Chief 
Justice intimated the majority’s belief that requests are better analyzed under common law is 
irrelevant.145  Once stripped of OPRA’s right to fees, fewer parties will pursue claims under 
common law,146 and OPRA will give agencies no pause before issuing pat denials to citizens 
requesting surveillance footage.  The majority remanded with instructions to resolve the request 
under the common law.147 
SCONJ once again construed OPRA exemptions liberally to deny an OPRA request for 
dashcam videos in NJMG,148 this time exempting police dashcam footage from disclosure pursuant 
                                                 
 
140 Id. (emphasis added) (suggesting citizens might be entitled, under common law, to surveillance footage capturing 
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141 Gilleran, 149 A.3d at 812 (Rabner, C.J., dissenting). 
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to OPRA’s criminal investigation.149  The plaintiff, a news agency, requested the dashcam footage 
from three different law enforcement vehicles.150  The footage depicted events leading up to and 
including the fatal shooting of Kashad Ashford wherein officers responded to a 911 call reporting 
that a black man had attempted to steal a car.151  Mr. Ashford was suspected of committing the 
crime and attempting to elude in his own vehicle.152  As police pursued, Mr. Ashford struck a 
guardrail with his SUV.153  Trying to dislodge the vehicle from the guardrail, Mr. Ashford caused 
his tires to spin out, filling the road with smoke,”154 and reportedly caused his SUV to jerk toward 
nearby officers.155  The pursuit ended with “four law enforcement officers discharg[ing] a total of 
thirteen rounds towards Mr. Ashford.”156   
The Record and the South Bergenite, newspapers owned by NJMG, demanded the police 
department produce copies of the dashcam videos pursuant to OPRA.157  The records custodian 
declined158 claiming the department could make a clear showing that the footage satisfied OPRA’s 
criminal investigation exception as the recording was: (1) “not required by law;” and (2) “pertained 
to criminal investigation.”159  The court noted it was not briefed on the existence of any statewide 
directives160 or local standing police orders relating to the use of dashboard cameras.161  As such, 
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the court was unable to determine whether the footage was “required by law” or not.162  SCONJ 
reasoned the footage fell within OPRA’s criminal investigation exemption because, 
extraordinarily, the requestor failed to show the footage was not exempt under the first prong of 
the exemption.163  As to the second prong, the court found the footage of a motor vehicle pursuit 
indeed “pertained to” an investigation.164  But as the footage was never shown to not be “required 
by law,” the newspapers’ request for the footage was properly denied under OPRA.165 
SCONJ further held that OPRA’s ongoing investigation exception did not apply.166  The 
government failed to show the footage did not pertain to an investigation in progress, disclosure 
was inimical to public interest,167 and the footage was not open for public inspection before the 
investigation.168  The court announced that, in general, dashcam footage will not pertain to an 
investigation in progress and is generally available to the public before the investigation.169  
SCONJ dedicated most of its analysis to the public interest prong.170  Contrary to the government’s 
position, public interest actually favored releasing the footage of the police shooting.171  Disclosure 
of dashcam footage “protect[s] the public and police alike in that videos can expose misconduct 
and debunk false accusations.”172  Generic allegations of the need for police anonymity for safety 
reasons will not justify the exemption.173  The court should weigh “the nature of the details to be 
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164 Id. at 903. 
165 Id. 
166 N. Jersey Media Grp.,163 A.3d at 903-4.  
167 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-3(b) (“It shall appear that the information requested or to be examined will jeopardize 
the safety of any person or jeopardize any investigation in progress or may be otherwise inappropriate to release.”). 
168 N. Jersey Media Grp.,163 A.3d at 905.   
169 Id. at 903. 
170 Id. at 905–06. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. at 907. 
173 Id. While the court ruled that the state need not show particularized threat of harm, it seemed to weigh this factor 




revealed, how extensive they are, and how they might interfere with an investigation.”174  The 
completion of interviews of principal witnesses and the public’s interest in transparency in matters 
of great concern (including fatal shootings) militates in favor of disclosure.175  Non-disclosure can 
“fuel the perception that information is being concealed.”176   
The court further held the footage should be released under the news agency’s common 
law right of access.177  Having already determined that the public had a great interest in obtaining 
video evidence of a fatal shooting, SCONJ expressly ruled that the government’s interests in 
confidentiality were less than the public’s interest in disclosure.178  As such, three years after the 
fatal shooting, the dashcam video became available to the newspapers.179  As access was granted 
pursuant to common law, the requestors were denied fees and costs.180 
B. N.J. Appellate Division Decisions (on Certification to SCONJ) Granting Access to 
Dashcam Footage 
 
New Jersey’s intermediate court has twice held the government must grant the public 
access to police dashcam footage.181  Both cases elicited dissent.182  The majority in both cases 
reasoned disclosure was required after construing OPRA exemptions narrowly.183  The 
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government appealed to SCONJ in Paff as a matter of right184—SCONJ heard oral argument in 
February 2018.185 
In Paff v. Ocean County Prosecutor’s Office, the Appellate Division granted a blogger’s 
request for the footage recorded by two dashcams mounted in police cars.186  The cameras recorded 
the stop of a motorist which resulted in charges filed against the responding officer for misconduct, 
aggravated assault, and misuse of a police dog.187  The officer allegedly “sicced his dog, Gunner, 
on [the driver Wendy Tucker] in the Barnegat municipal lot after she was already in custody.”188  
The court held the government failed to show the footage was confidential under OPRA’s 
exceptions for either criminal investigations or ongoing investigations.189   
The Appellate Division repeatedly emphasized the government bore the burden to show 
OPRA authorized denial of access.190  The Paff Court rejected that government’s position that it 
need only make a facial showing of a statutory exemption under OPRA, after which the requestor 
would bear the burden of rebutting the facial showing.191  The government failed to prove the 
footage pertained to an investigation and was “not be required by law.”192  Because the local police 
chief had issued an order that Tuckerton officers must activate the dashcam with the activation of 
sirens and emergency lights, the footage was “required by law.”193  The standing order carried the 
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force of law as it was a “clear expression of policy pertaining to citizen encounters with members 
of law enforcement,” binding on local officers.194  The footage did not pertain to an investigation 
as traffic stops generally do not.195  Tacitly approving the Appellate Division’s analysis, SCONJ 
tipped its cards on this issue in 2017: “a routine traffic stop, in which a suspect obeyed the police 
and pulled over, would [not] necessarily ‘pertain’ to a criminal investigation.”196  As such, the 
criminal investigation exception was not applicable.197 
The Appellate Division further found the government failed to prove an ongoing 
investigation.  The video did not pertain to an investigation in progress; release was not inimical 
to public interest; and the footage was available for inspection before the investigation as the 
officer had activated the dashcam before any investigation began.198  The subsequent investigation 
into the officer’s misconduct did not permit the government to drop the footage into a privileged 
“ongoing investigation” folder.199  As the court ordered release under OPRA, it did not analyze 
the facts under common law.200 
The dissent found the footage pertained to an investigation and was not required under law, 
inasmuch as local police directives could not carry the force of law under the OPRA exception.201  
Judge Gilson would have nevertheless remanded with instruction to analyze the request under the 
common law.202 
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In a similar matter, the Ganzweig court ordered the release of dashcam footage depicting 
the stop of a driver who made an illegal left turn. 203  The officer permitted the driver to leave, but 
then grew suspicious that the driver and passenger had provided false names.204  The officer 
stopped the vehicle a second time, discovered illegal drugs, and issued summons.205  The county 
prosecutor dismissed the charges against the driver and passenger and instead indicted the 
responding officer for misconduct, namely conducting an illegal search and falsifying his 
wrongdoing.206  The majority found the footage was not a criminal investigatory record under 
OPRA because a local police order required the incident be recorded.207  The ongoing investigation 
exception was also inapplicable because the government failed to show release would be inimical 
to public interest.208  
The dissent echoed the Paff dissent in finding the record pertained to an investigation and 
was not required under law, inasmuch as local police directives could not carry the force of law 
under the OPRA exception.209  Ganzweig was not appealed to SCONJ as a matter of right. 
V.  Predicting SCONJ’s “Preference” Regarding Release of BWC Footage 
 
New Jersey courts should interpret OPRA as generally granting the public access to BWC 
footage, such that a requestor should rarely be required to prove her interest in disclosure 
outweighs the government’s interest in confidentiality.  Law enforcement agencies across New 
Jersey have deployed BWCs to promote police accountability and transparency.210  These policy 
                                                 
 




206 Id. at *4. 
207 Id. at *7. 
208 Id. 
209 Ganzweig, 2017 WL 3687522, at *11–12 (Reisner, J., dissenting). 




goals will be met only if the public has strong, cheap, and ready access to BWC footage. 211  OPRA 
alone provides the public with the right to ready access to government records; common law 
requests are slow, expensive, and weak.212  These drawbacks will frustrate the goals of BWC 
programs.213 
As a threshold matter, SCONJ is likely to hold that BWC footage is a public record for 
OPRA purposes as SCONJ has already held that dashcam footage is a public record under 
OPRA.214  Recent SCONJ decisions, analyzed in Part V-A below, suggest that the court is 
nevertheless poised to construe exemptions broadly to limit disclosure of BWC footage under 
OPRA.  Part V-B argues SCONJ, in reviewing the Paff decision, should construe OPRA’s 
exemptions narrowly. 
A. SCONJ’s Derogation from OPRA 
The Gilleran court announced SCONJ’s “preference” for analyzing requests for 
government surveillance footage under the common law.215  It does not fall with SCONJ’s remit 
to decide by fiat that requests are better analyzed under the common law than OPRA.216  The 
judiciary’s role is to interpret OPRA, not circumvent it.217  The majority characterized its 
interpretation of OPRA’s security exemption as “sensible.”218  Whether sensible or not, the 
majority’s finding that the release of the footage “could” jeopardize safety—not that it “would” as 
OPRA requires—is a derogation from OPRA’s mandate to construe exceptions to the statute in 
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favor of the public’s right of access.219  The court’s inflammatory evocation of September 11, 2001 
in its opinion220 smacks more as an acknowledgement of overreach than as a rationale for straying 
from OPRA.  Chief Justice Rabner, dissenting, aptly criticized the majority for failing to construe 
OPRA exceptions narrowly. 221  In rejecting the OPRA’s unambiguous mandates, the majority 
arrogated onto itself the power to determine the degree of secrecy—that “instrument of Old World 
tyranny” in Justice Douglas’s colorful words—in which the government may operate.222   
In the years to come, the requestor seeking BWC footage will likely attempt to distinguish 
Gilleran, and its holding that OPRA grants no right to demand the “wholesale release” of 
surveillance footage that “could” jeopardize the safety of any person.  Litigants requesting access 
to BWC under OPRA will no doubt argue the Gilleran camera was an inconspicuous second-floor 
camera obscured by smoked glass and that BWCs are much more conspicuous.223  Requestors may 
also argue that a citizen could legally record many of the events captured by an officer’s BWC.224  
Requestors will insist the first security exception in OPRA applies only to buildings and 
facilities.225  These distinctions are likely to prove unavailing:  the Gilleran court bottomed its 
ruling on commonsense need to conceal surveillance limitations.226  Further, citizens cannot follow 
officers for their entire shifts as officers enter the private spheres to interview informants, 
witnesses, and victims.  As officers with BWCs can enter private realms, security concerns are 
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much greater in the BWC context than in the context of a fixed surveillance or dashcam.227   The 
government will rely on the second security exception in OPRA which concerns the safety of all 
persons and is not limited to those in buildings and facilities.228 
As BWC cases ripen, SCONJ is likely to expand the Gilleran ban of “wholesale” release 
of surveillance footage to ban “wholesale” release of BWC footage.  Courts will no doubt uphold 
denials for BWC footage depicting an officer’s entire shift.  The footage taken by the entire force 
for an entire day or week will, a fortiori, be denied.  SCONJ is keenly aware of the concerns raised 
by the aggregation of data and will likely construe OPRA’s security exceptions liberally to protect 
the safety of officers equipped with BWCs.229   
As an officer patrols her beat, she defines the general geographic scope and general 
recording times of her observations.  Wholesale release of footage would permit a citizen to 
analyze where an officer generally does and does not patrol; such analysis could enable a requestor 
to identify “security measures and surveillance techniques which . . . would create a risk to the 
safety of” 230  the officer and the public.  The danger is heightened not only by the length of footage, 
but by the number of cameras.  Wholesale release of all BWCs and dashboard footage on a given 
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week would enable citizens to plot and predict the geographic limits and general frequency of 
police surveillance of all officers equipped with cameras.231  Criminals might pay for maps 
aggregating this data in an effort to target officers or to plan crimes where officers rarely patrol. 
Extending Gilleran to BWCs would sensibly limit the public access to BWC footage under 
OPRA.  Yet, SCONJ need not derogate from OPRA’s mandate to exempt only records that “would 
create a risk to the safety” 232 to protect law enforcement officers.  SCONJ should cabin Gilleran.  
The government should be required to make a clear showing that release of BWC would endanger 
officers or others.  Further, Gilleran’s ban on disclosure should also not be overstated.  Gilleran 
upheld the denial of a request for fourteen hours of footage.233  This bears little resemblance to a 
request for one hour of BWC footage, which would not enable the viewer to determine the 
geographic and temporal limits of an officer patrol.   
Once again construing OPRA’s criminal exemption broadly, SCONJ denied an OPRA 
request for police footage in NJMG.234  The government sought to exclude dashcam footage as 
part of a criminal investigation.235  Although this exception is only applicable where the 
government makes a clear showing that the records is both “not required by law” and “pertains to 
an investigation,” the court did not require the town to prove the first prong.236  No witness certified 
to the absence of standing orders or other laws requiring officers to record traffic stops such as the 
one captured in the requested video.237  The parties did not submit or brief SCONJ on the existence 
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of any Attorney General directives or local standing orders. 238  Under OPRA, the government is 
required to make a “clear showing” that the footage was not required by law to be made.239  But 
SCONJ deviated from OPRA and ruled that since the court was unable to determine whether the 
footage was “required by law” from the record, the exemption applied.240 
Perhaps this approach is reasonable, inasmuch as no orders or directive may actually exist.  
Yet, the ruling ignores OPRA’s mandate: (1) that the government marshal clear evidence to justify 
nondisclosure,241 and (2) that the judiciary construe all exemptions to OPRA in favor of public 
access.242  A more prudent course may have been to remand the case to determine whether any 
directives existed.  NJMG shifts the burden—without comment—to the requestor, who must now 
prove that the record is “required by law” to be made.243  The Appellate Division correctly rejected 
such burden shifting in Paff.244 
Rather than remand the matter to determine whether directives or other laws required the 
officer to record the stop, SCONJ instead analyzed the request under common law.245  Chief Justice 
Rabner, now writing for the majority, abandoned the concerns he voiced in his Gilleran dissent: 
that the court should not prefer to analyze some requests under common law.246  After all, only 
affluent requestors can press their case without OPRA’s summary procedures and fee-shifting 
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provisions.247  Perhaps the Chief Justice viewed the OPRA denial in NJMG as a proper result of 
the newspapers’ failure to brief the court on the existence of relevant dashcam directives.248   
Perhaps the court inferred no such directives existed.  A savvier litigant may, at the time of its 
initial request, seek all of the local and state directives requiring the records be made by law.  But 
this is not what OPRA requires of the requestor.249  The government bears the burden to show an 
exemption applies.250  SCONJ does not have the authority to circumvent OPRA’s mandates where 
it finds the common law expedient.251  Although the town was ordered to release the dashcam 
footage,252 NJMG is also not a case of “no harm, no foul.”  The court’s bypass of OPRA denied 
the prevailing requestor’s right under OPRA to recover significant attorney’s fees.253  
In future cases, SCONJ will likely extend NJMG to requests for BWC footage, finding that 
the criminal investigation exemption applies where no directive requires the recording be made 
and the matter also pertains to a crime.  NJMG also suggests that the ongoing investigation 
exemption should not apply where the recording was activated prior to investigation.254  As the 
Attorney General’s Directive instructs law enforcement officers to activate BWCs in numerous 
situations other than investigations and encourages willing precincts to use the cameras in as many 
situations as it is safe and legal to record,255 NJMG suggests that the ongoing investigation 
exception will have limited applicability to the BWC context.  NJMG also announces policy 
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reasons favoring the release of dashcam footage,256 policy declarations which will torpedo future 
efforts by the government to apply the ongoing investigation exception to police footage.  The 
government will no doubt argue in BWC cases that NJMG should be distinguished.  Dashcams 
reveal images overwhelmingly taken from public roadways.257  Footage generally lacks detail.258  
Reflections on windshields, particularly from police lights at night, distort recordings.259  Trial 
courts releasing BWC under the common law are to consider, the “nature of the details,” their 
extent, and their potential to interfere with an investigation.260  Given the likelihood that footage 
from BWCs will generally contain greater details than footage from surveillance and dashcams, it 
is likely access to BWCs will be more restricted than access to dashcams under the common law 
factors set forth in NJMG. 
B. SCONJ’s Next Move 
SCONJ has an opportunity to return to the strict interpretation of OPRA’s exceptions in 
Paff.261  The government argued in Paff that OPRA requests for police dashcam footage should be 
denied because the footage falls under OPRA’s criminal investigation exception, as being required 
by law and pertaining to criminal acts.262  SCONJ should uphold the Appellate Division’s finding 
that the local police chief’s order, having the force of law under OPRA, required the responding 
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officers to activate the cameras when sirens and emergency lights were activated.263  Indeed, the 
vehicle was wired such that the camera automatically turned on with the sirens and emergency 
lights.264  On the other hand, SCONJ should not find that the footage pertained to an investigation.  
As the Appellate Division aptly reasoned, in most instances, a traffic stop and pursuit of a 
suspecting criminal violation of the law does not pertain to an investigation.265  SCONJ appears to 
have tacitly approved of this reasoning in NJMG: “a routine traffic stop, in which a suspect obeyed 
the police and pulled over, would [not] necessarily ‘pertain’ to a criminal investigation.”266  As 
such, the criminal investigation exception should not apply. 
SCONJ should not conclude that the dashcam recordings pertain to an investigation 
because the camera was activated “to investigate an in-progress eluding incident,” as Judge Gilson 
argued in his dissent.267  Permitting the government to exclude video from disclosure in routine 
traffic stops is a slippery slope.  It could be argued that all traffic stops, initiated by a bona fide 
belief that the driver has violated a motor vehicle statute, trigger investigative actions beyond those 
related to the underlying violation.  The officer determines whether the vehicle is registered, 
inspected, or stolen; whether the driver has a valid license, acts suspiciously, conceals contraband, 
attempts to flee.  Common experience should lead the court to recognize the officer seeks to elicit 
an admission from the driver, “Do you know why I pulled you over?”268  By these lights, the officer 
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is almost always attempting to investigate, either to strengthen the State’s case against the driver 
for the moving violation or to find grounds for additional citations.  According to such reasoning, 
it would be rare that a “traffic stop, in which a suspect obeyed the police and pulled over, would 
[not] necessarily ‘pertain’ to a criminal investigation.”269  Yet, these same arguments can be made 
of nearly every police caretaking duty.  The officer with a bona fide belief that a woman leaving a 
bar may be intoxicated approaches her to determine such facts as: (1) whether she intends to drive; 
(2) whether she has a joint; and (3) whether she has paid her bar bill.   
Rather than apply the exception to nearly all police interactions, SCONJ must interpret 
OPRA’s exemption narrowly.  Narrow construction will maximize the Act’s policy goals of 
government transparency.270   Paff presents SCONJ with the opportunity to limit OPRA’s criminal 
investigation exception to felonies.  Traffic violations and violations of ordinances, where 
investigations are nearly invariably limited to the violation itself, should not permit the State to 
conceal either dashcam footage or—when such cases come before the court—BWC footage. 
 
C. Privacy Concerns Do Not Require Balancing Interests Under the Common Law 
 
Because the common law approach seems well suited to weigh privacy concerns, 
exempting BWCs from OPRA appeals to some courts as well as some in the political branches.271  
This approach is not required.  OPRA permits courts to balance countervailing interests in privacy. 
OPRA charges public agencies with the duty to safeguard “personal information” with 
which it has been “entrusted” which might violate a citizen’s “reasonable expectation of 
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privacy.”272   In Serrano v. South Brunswick Township, one of the earliest cases interpreting OPRA, 
the court explained that the privacy provision of the Act requires the court to balance public and 
private interests before ordering the release of records.273  After reasoning that neither the ongoing 
nor criminal investigation exceptions applied, the Serrano court held that public interest in 
disclosure of the 911 tapes made by a murder suspect several hours before allegedly killing his 
father militated in favor of release, especially where release was unopposed by the caller.274  The 
court noted that it was appropriate to consider and balance the interests of: the specific 911 caller, 
911 callers in general, and individuals specifically mentioned during the 911 call.275  Further, 
courts may consider the need for individual notice to those whose privacy is implicated in the 
request as well as the interplay between OPRA’s mandate to construe the right of access in the 
public’s favor and citizen’s reasonable expectation of privacy.276  In sum, the Act authorizes the 
court to consider specific and general privacy rights of citizens, even those who are not parties to 
the dispute.277  When privacy is implicated, the court may engage in balancing test very similar to 
the Loigman test, and the requestor will be entitled to all of OPRA’s added procedural and 
substantive protections. 
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In addition to the broad privacy provision of section 47:1A-1, OPRA exempts the 
disclosure of SSNs, names, and telephone numbers.278  OPRA further recognizes carve outs to the 
statute created by New Jersey’s statutes and constitution.279  Identifiers of informants and of 
witness are exempt.280  Victims are also shielded.281 
Thus footage of an overwrought mourner282 or victim’s bodies283 might be exempt,284 
especially where survivors object to disclosure.   Images of children may be exempt.285  Images of 
nudity may be exempt.286  Improperly disclosed records may give rise to a tort action.287  Finally, 
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are exposed or who is engaged in an act of sexual penetration or sexual contact, without that person’s consent… shall 
be [civilly] liable to that person.”). 
287 Title 59 generally affords government agencies immunity for negligent acts. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59.  Kelly Freund 
suggests the tort will create a limit on release of improperly obtained footage, e.g., illegal searches of homes.  See 
Kelly Freund, When Cameras Are Rolling: Privacy Implications of Body-Mounted Cameras on Police, 49 COLUM. 
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 91, 124 (2015).  The New Jersey Constitution may provide for a tort akin to a federal Bivens 
claim: “The right to privacy has been defined as the “right of an individual to be . . . protected from any wrongful 
intrusion into his private life which would outrage or cause mental suffering, shame or humiliation to a person of 
ordinary sensibilities.”  Burnett v. County of Bergen, 954 A.2d 483, 491 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008).  Soliman 
v. Kushner Cos, 77 A.3d 1214 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013) (tort of invasion lied where employer intentionally 
filmed employees in a bathroom).  But there was no tort “for observing [a plaintiff] or even taking his photograph 
while he is walking on a public highway, since he is not then in seclusion, and his appearance is public and open to 




OPRA in no way abrogates common law privacy exceptions,288 which empower judges to 
foreclose access to records that would be extremely offensive to the sensibilities of a reasonable 
person.289  The general privacy interests of police officers have been found to be 
inconsequential,290 although personnel files are protected.291   
As such, under current law, for instance, the family of hypothetical Suspect Sam has the 
right to oppose the release of the footage graphically showing Sam’s last words.  Once opposed, 
the courts should balance the requestor’s and the public’s interest in disclosure against the family’s 
interest in privacy.  This will occur only where the family asserts its privacy right; the government 
would be required to notify the family to inquire whether the family wishes to oppose release.292 
Further, it appears that BWC footage showing a citizen’s driver’s license in a traffic stop 
would be exempt from disclosure, while footage of the rest of a routine traffic stop would be 
accessible.293  By extension, BWC footage of a person requesting police assistance might be 
opposed by the individual and could be redacted to protect the privacy of the individual.294    
Finally, the Directive on the use of BWCs obviates many privacy concerns.  The Directive 
declares the program shall minimize intrusion of privacy of persons captured on BWC and avoid 
the chilling effect on victim and witness cooperation with police which might result from 
disclosure.295  The Directive generally achieves this by ordering law enforcement agents to 
                                                 
 
2011)(finding tort where wife planted tracking device in husband’s car, as car never entered secluded locations out of 
public view). 
288 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-9. 
289 Asbury Park Press v. Ocean Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 864 A.2d 446, 458 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2004). 
290 N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Twp. of Lyndhurst, 163 A.3d 887, 887 (N.J. 2017). 
291 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-10 (personnel files are exempt). 
292 Cf. L.R. v. Camden City Pub. Sch. Disc., 452 N.J. Super. 56, cert. granted/denied (N.J. 2018). 
293 N. Jersey Media Grp. Inc., 146 A.3d 656 (noting OPRA bars the release of “identifying information about a person 
that originates with the individual and is ‘entrusted’ to the government”).  
294 Cf. Serrano v. South Brunswick Twp., 817 A.2d 1004, 1014 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003). 




deactivate cameras in places where greater privacy concerns have traditionally been recognized:  
private residences, hospitals, schools, and places of worship.296   
As such, OPRA is suited to weigh competing interests in privacy and in disclosure.  The 
courts have no reason to find the common law is better suited to analyze cases involving sensitive 
government footage. 
 
VI. Strong Statutory Rights of Access to BWC Footage Will Promote Police Accountability 
and Transparency 
 
This Comment began by posing three questions about footage depicting Suspect Sam’s 
death.  (1) Should the public have full access to the footage?  (2) Should the government be able 
to withhold the footage while it conducts a criminal investigation? (2) Should the suspect’s family 
have a say?   
Yes, in general, OPRA should grant the public access to BWC footage; the Act’s 
exceptions should be narrowly construed.  More facts must be given to determine whether the 
criminal investigation exemption might apply.  Was the footage not required by law and pertaining 
to a criminal investigation?  If the BWC runs nonstop or nearly so, the footage should not be 
exempt, as it is not commenced as part of an investigation.  Footage of a routine traffic stop should 
also not be exempt, as it does not pertain to a criminal investigation.  Footage that was recorded in 
compliance with a local standing order, for example to activate a BWC camera whenever starting 
an investigation, could be exempt.  Accordingly, more facts are needed to answer this question 
satisfactorily.  Lastly, the family should have a say.  If the family opposes the release of the graphic 
video, the court should weigh the family’s privacy interests against the requestor’s and the public’s 
                                                 
 




right to know whether the officers wrongfully caused Suspect Sam’s death.  The public interest in 
such video would generally outweigh the family’s interest in privacy according to NJMG.297 
In conclusion, strong statutory rights of access to BWC footage are required to promote 
police accountability and transparency.  If the release of the footage in the above hypothetical is 
delayed or frustrated, the public may assume the police wish to hide some wrongdoing.  SCONJ 
should engage in a strict OPRA analysis, hewing to the mandates of the Act, rather than subjecting 
requests to common law balancing tests to make sure that all videos available under OPRA become 
available to the public as quickly as possible.  Paff enables SCONJ to clarify the scope of the 
criminal law exemption.  The exemption should also never be applied to investigations where the 
defendant is accused of some violation less than a felony.  
                                                 
 
297 N. Jersey Media Grp., 163 A.3d at 887. 
